Brian Boero wrote a good one about how home search keeps getting worse and how nobody’s coming to save the buyer. He’s right that the buyer won’t save themselves. I just think he’s looking at the wrong rescuers.
“The Consumer is an abstraction; the empowered real estate consumer is largely a fiction.”
True. No consumer uprising is coming. People will put up with a worse home search the same way they put up with worse airlines and smaller candy bars.
Boero says “in time, the regulators may do something about it.” They already are. Washington passed a law that says listings have to be marketed to everybody. Connecticut and New York wrote the warning into the paperwork sellers sign. More states are lined up for January.
But regulators are the slow lane. The fast lane is the lawyers.
Last week the president of the NAACP, Derrick Johnson, wrote in Time that private listing networks are “more than an industry dispute. This is a civil rights issue.” His piece comes with numbers: sellers in majority-minority zip codes lose more when a home stays off the MLS, and MLS listings sell for around 17.5% more than off-MLS ones.
Read that again as a plaintiff’s attorney. You’ve got a protected class, a measurable harm, and a price gap you can put in front of a jury. And you don’t have to prove anybody meant to discriminate. A Texas broker laid the theory out back in March: under the Fair Housing Act, “You don’t have to prove anyone intended to discriminate.” Disparate impact does the work.
If that sounds familiar, it should. That’s Sitzer/Burnett. A theory, a damages number, and a sympathetic class. The commission lawsuits started as a fringe argument too, right up until they cost the industry billions and rewrote the rulebook.
So no, the consumer won’t fix online search. But three other parties are lining up to take a swing at it. The statehouses. A U.S. senator (Elizabeth Warren just sent Compass and MRED 23 questions about fair housing risk). And the trial bar, which just got its opening argument handed to it by the NAACP.
Boero says all this is “only good for lawyers and reporters.” Speaking as one of the “reporters”, I’d keep an eye on the lawyers.
“I introduced her to my loved one, and while they were dancing, my friend stole my sweetheart from me.”
The Tennessee Waltz is the saddest song ever written about handing something precious to a friend. It’s also a pretty good history of this industry and Zillow. We introduced our listings to a friendly portal, the music played, and you know how the song ends.
Which is why it matters that Tennessee, of all places, just rewrote the ending.
“Zillow will notify Realtracs at the same time an agent receives a notification that they have reached the threshold for listing suppression under Zillow’s Listing Access Standards. This provides greater transparency into those situations and gives Realtracs the information needed to work directly with brokers and agents to ensure healthy cooperation.”
So the Nashville standoff ends with a signature. Realtracs called out Zillow’s Listing Access Standards back in May, set a deadline, extended it twice, and after ten weeks of negotiating we get a “modernized license agreement.” Compare that to Chicago, where MRED pulled the feed, a federal judge ordered it turned back on, and the lawyers are still billing. Realtracs walks away with a contract. MRED walks away with a court date.
Both sides get to declare “victory” here. Zillow told Real Estate News its Listing Access Standards “remain in full effect across the Nashville region” and were “not modified as part of this agreement.” Stuart White gets defined use rights, AI and LLM guardrails on broker-created content, better listing activity reporting, and my favorite part, the pull quote above. Until now Zillow could bench an agent’s listings and the MLS would find out from an angry phone call. Now Realtracs gets the notification the moment the agent does.
But the real story is the paper itself. Back in April, Realtracs tore up its Participation Agreement and put “the broker owns the listing” in writing. This looks like chapter two of the same strategy: stand up a Data Licensing Platform, Homes.com was the first, now Zillow. The line at the bottom of the press release, “as additional technology providers renew their agreements,” is doing a lot of work. Every vendor pulling a Realtracs feed should expect the same paperwork.
Will AI guardrails in a license agreement actually stop a foundation model from ingesting listings? Probably about as well as robots.txt did. But enforcement starts with terms, and you can’t enforce terms you never wrote down. In the post-settlement world the license agreement is the new rulebook.
Realtracs is still dancing with Zillow. It’s just done lending out its sweetheart without a word in writing.
“When homes move into closed or semi-closed channels, that basic fairness can break down. Buyers who are not connected with the “right” agent, broker, or social network may never have the chance to find their dream home. Sellers may lose out on a better deal because fewer buyers know their home is available. Smaller brokerages and agents lose access to critical information that is no longer shared equally.
That should concern anyone who cares about fair housing.”
“Real estate agents are more confident than ever that the comparative market analysis (CMA), a fundamentally human document, matters most in an increasingly automated industry. That’s the headline finding of the 2026 Survey of Best Practices for CMAs & Listing Presentations, released today by Giant Steps Advisors in partnership with Lone Wolf Technologies.
Back in 2020 my company W+R Studios did a survey of best practices for CMAs and listing presentations. I wondered what had changed in six years, so we decided to run the survey again, in partnership with Lone Wolf, and add a few new questions. We got responses from 2,165 U.S. real estate professionals across 46 states. One thing that jumped out at us: 89.6% said CMAs will be more relevant in the future, up from 67% in 2020. That 22-point jump is the biggest shift on any question in the survey.
Think about it: for twenty years people have been writing the CMA’s obituary. The Zestimate was going to kill it. iBuyers were going to kill it. Now AI is going to kill it.
Here’s what those predictions missed. More public data did NOT make sellers better calibrated. It made them more anchored, and more confident in a wrong number. Every appointment now starts with some version of “Zillow says my house is worth this much.” That’s the screenshot era. So the pricing conversation didn’t go away when data got cheap. It got harder. Look at the number: pricing as the #1 objection jumped from 52.7% to 63.7%. The flood of free numbers didn’t replace the professional who can interpret them. It created a bigger, harder problem that only a professional can solve. Scarcity of data was never the agent’s value. Judgment about data is.
You can download the full results of the survey here.
“When sellers choose to publicly market their homes and make them available to the broadest possible audience, Zillow is keeping those listings from buyers because they were not initially prioritized on Zillow,” the spokesperson said over email. “In some cases, Zillow is displaying active, publicly available listings as not for sale.”
The Industry Relations Podcast is now available on your favorite podcast player!
Overview
Rob and Greg are joined by Nick Aufenkamp (Realtor Gone Rogue), a Vancouver, WA-based broker and Substack writer, for a debate on the Zillow v. MRED lawsuit, private/exclusive listings, and whether the MLS should function as a public utility. Nick attended the preliminary injunction hearing in person and shares firsthand takeaways on Compass, MRED, and Zillow’s roles in the case, followed by a wide-ranging debate on data access, buyer vs. public rights, Bright MLS’s new listing rules, and NAR’s recent guidance on exclusive listings.
Key Takeaways
Nick introduces himself: a broker of ~5 years in Vancouver, WA, founder of the DIY Home Buyer Academy, and writer of the Realtor Gone Rogue Substack, launched in February 2026.
Nick recaps the Zillow v. MRED preliminary injunction hearing, which determines whether MRED must keep Zillow’s data feed live for 40,000+ Chicagoland listings.
Discussion of whether Compass’s move to feed out-of-state listings into MRED forced MRED’s hand, and whether MRED “got played” in its partnership with Compass.
Debate over whether an MLS has an implicit geographic boundary, and who gets to define “objective criteria” for listing access under the 2008 DOJ/NAR settlement.
Analysis of Bright MLS’s new rule letting agents skip syndication and price/days-on-market tracking without penalty, and how it could reshape Compass’s “3-phase marketing” strategy.
Core philosophical debate: does the general public have any rights to MLS data, or only buyers — and does treating the MLS as a “public utility” mean it should be regulated as one?
Rob and Greg spar over whether hiding listing data (price, days on market) erodes public trust or simply reflects a legitimate marketing strategy.
Discussion of fiduciary duty and lawsuits as a check on bad-actor brokerages, versus more mandatory disclosure rules.
Closing debate on whether NAR is still genuinely invested in the MLS, and whether its recent guidance on exclusive listings is too little, too late.
The Industry Relations Podcast is now available on your favorite podcast player!
Overview
Rob and Greg kick off with some World Cup talk before diving into the Zillow vs. Compass preliminary injunction hearing, covering media coverage (Real Estate News, Inman, Nick Alfenkamp’s Substack), key testimony from Errol Samuelson on listing freshness, and cross-examination details involving Robert Reffkin and MRED. They debate whether Zillow “rules the industry” or whether the MLS cooperative model still holds, unpack what legitimate competition looks like in real estate, and explore what Compass’s strategy should be going forward — doubling down on agents vs. positioning against AI and big tech. The episode closes with a wide-ranging, contentious debate on whether private/exclusive listings carry fair housing implications tied to America’s history of housing discrimination.
Key Takeaways
Coverage of the Zillow vs. Compass hearing came primarily from Real Estate News, Inman (AJ Trace), and Nick Alfenkamp’s Substack; Zillow reportedly covered Alfenkamp’s travel expenses to the trial.
Errol Samuelson testified that a new listing gets significantly more views on its first day than by day five, framing the core dispute as who gets to benefit from “fresh” listings — the listing broker/MLS cooperative or the largest portal (Zillow).
Reporting suggested Robert Reffkin encouraged Bright MLS to follow MRED’s example and reacted negatively when Bright chose to stay neutral; MRED had reportedly run private listing networks for a decade before Compass became a major player there.
Rob argues MLS rules were broken and Zillow is seeking a legal exemption; Greg counters that broker cooperatives generally avoid side deals with MLSs to preserve a level playing field.
A ruling from the judge is expected around the end of the month.
Rob and Greg discuss Compass strategy options: positioning as a tech company (rejected by Wall Street), inventory/listing differentiation (private listings), and scaling via agent count (the Anywhere deal). Greg suggests Compass should double down on agent quality/reputation and buyer-demand data rather than “cheat codes” like exclusive inventory.
They debate potential enemies for a Compass marketing strategy — NAR, Zillow, or AI/big tech broadly — with Rob arguing consumer trust in tech companies has shifted negatively in recent years.
Extended debate on whether competing on exclusive inventory is illegitimate specifically in real estate (vs. law, banking, etc.), including whether fair housing history and housing discrimination sensitivities explain the industry’s resistance to private listings.
“Zillow’s partnership with Opendoor was also brought up on multiple occasions. MRED and Compass sought to undermine Zillow’s claims of fighting for transparency and market visibility on the basis of their support of Opendoor buying off-market properties. In another apparent hypocrisy, Zillow supported sellers who chose to sell their home off-market to Opendoor. The attorneys argued that if Zillow cares so much about sellers getting maximum market exposure and buyers having the opportunity to see every available home, how can they simultaneously endorse a platform in which sellers obtain less than market value and no other buyer has any opportunity to see the home before Opendoor closes on it?”
I hadn’t thought of this angle. Not a strong argument for Compass, but interesting.
A joint Compass-MRED press release from April, announcing MRED’s purported national expansion, promised that Compass would provide all of its nationwide listings to MRED and subsidize memberships for up to 100,000 agents. Neither commitment has come close to being fulfilled. Internal Compass emails show executives scrambling over subsidy logistics four days after the press release, with one noting that even a $10-per-agent subsidy “would cost us $1 million.” Broude forwarded that email to a colleague with three facepalm emojis. The colleague replied: “What. A. Mess.”
So even Compass‘ own executives thought subsidizing MLS memberships was a bad idea? “Mess” is the wrong word.
As I write this, Compass CEO, Robert Reffkin. is sitting in a federal courtroom in Chicago. Zillow’s preliminary injunction hearing against MRED and Compass opened this week, and the CEO of the largest brokerage in America is on the witness list. Post-hearing briefs are due July 9th. However Judge Tarp rules, one thing is already clear: this is not where a winning strategy ends up.
So let’s play a game. What would I do if I were Robert Reffkin?
First, some history.
Compass came out of the gate as a technology company that happened to do brokerage. That was the whole pitch. Their former CTO Joseph Sirosh (a Microsoft AI guy, no less) described Compass as a marketplace platform, like Amazon. They IPO’d in April 2021 at $18 a share.
Strategy Number One : We are a tech company
Wall Street looked under the hood and saw a real estate brokerage with a big engineering budget. The stock sank as low as $1.96. It sits around $12 today. Over $900 million went into that platform, and in August 2022 Sirosh was let go as part of a cost reduction program. Strategy number one, dead. And too be fair many brokerages tried the “we are technology company” angle. Remember Gary Keller of Keller Williams on stage? Good times.
Strategy Number Two: Inventory differentiation
If you can’t differentiate on tech, differentiate on inventory. In late 2024 Compass rolled out its 3-Phase Marketing Strategy. Start every listing as a Private Exclusive, stair-step to Coming Soon, then (maybe) the MLS. The vision, as I understand it, is billboards that say “Compass has listings Zillow doesn’t.” Make the buyers come to you.
The problem is that the entire plumbing of American real estate is built to work the other way. So Compass went to war with it. The Clear Cooperation fight. Reffkin personally emailed MLS executives asking them to cut Zillow’s feeds. The NWMLS litigation in Washington, where the MLS is now counterclaiming that the 3-Phase program is consumer deception, with a state law on its side. The MRED partnership I covered in “Dracarys,” with Compass possibly subsidizing 100,000 agent memberships. MRED cut Zillow’s feed over nine listings, the TRO 48 hours later, and now this week’s hearing. I wrote about all of it. It’s a lot. And I hear MRED membership count hasn’t moved a bit. Rob, get ready to buy me that steak dinner.
And while Compass was fighting that war, the biggest distribution player on earth quietly picked a side. I wrote last week about Google building its national home search on MLS data. Every private network, every coming-soon feed, every velvet rope in the business was available to them, and the company that knows more about how people search than anyone alive bet on the open MLS. So here’s the question that should haunt the whole strategy: what is a Private Exclusive worth when Google can’t see it? Strategy number two, dead.
Strategy Number Three: Scale.
If you control more listings than anyone, maybe the industry has to come to the table. So Compass bought Anywhere. Announced September 2025, closed January 9th, $1.6 billion in stock, and suddenly Reffkin runs Coldwell Banker, Century 21, Sotheby’s, Corcoran, and ERA…awesome…wow. Per the 2026 RealTrends data, Compass did $262 billion in volume and Anywhere did $193 billion. Combined, that’s 47% of everything the top ten brokerages in America sold. The deal sailed through the federal HSR waiting period, but Letitia James’s office opened an antitrust inquiry in June, and there’s now a class action in Florida over Compass’s $475 transaction fee. Hard to argue “consumer choice” in one courtroom while consumers are suing you in another. Scale bought him more courtrooms. Strategy number three, is on life support.
And here’s the part that should keep him up at night. While Compass was fighting the listing wars, AI ate the moat. Everything changed after Claude Code, and then OpenClaw in January. Any software built before AI isn’t an asset anymore. It’s an anchor. That $900 million platform Wall Street wouldn’t pay a multiple for? An agent with a laptop can now spin up most of it in a weekend. The “we’re a tech company” argument didn’t just fail to convince Wall Street. It expired. Time to pull the plug Robert.
Which brings us to the fever dream. Wall Street has always had one about real estate: why are we paying agents so much? It reminds me of Travis Kalanick saying the quiet part out loud, that Uber would be a better business without drivers. Now with AI, the fever dream has a new pitch deck. Fewer humans for everything, including real estate.
But there’s a graveyard full of proptech companies that bet against the agent. And they all died for the same reason. A home is the biggest purchase most people ever make. It’s emotional. It’s infrequent, so nobody gets good at it. You live there. You raise your kids there. People want a trusted human for that, and I don’t think AI changes it. I think AI makes it more true, because when a machine can do everything else, the trusted human is the scarce thing.
So here’s what I’d do if I were Robert Reffkin. Stop differentiatingthe listings. Differentiate the agents.
And I mean with teeth, because “we have the best agents” is what every brokerage has claimed since the dawn of the yard sign. Here’s the version with teeth: radical transparency. Publish every Compass agent’s track record. Actual days on market. Sale-to-list ratio. How often they double-end. Nick Aufenkamp’s whole critique of the private listings movement is that it hides the negative insights buyers need. Imagine Compass answering that critique with more information instead of less. “We hide nothing, including exactly how good our agents are” is a strategy. It also happens to be the perfect reversal for a company currently in federal court defending its right to hide days on market.
And if you want proof that nobody else in this industry will follow him there, NAR just provided it.
Two weeks ago at NAR’s midyear meetings, the board killed a proposal requiring REALTORS® to disclose to clients when they lack knowledge about a property type or geographic area. The Professional Standards Committee spent two years crafting it. The commitee chair called it something “we all should be doing anyway.” The board debated it for an hour and sent it back to committee to die. Here’s the line from a Florida director that tells you everything:
“We do not need to create ‘ahas’ or ‘gotchas’ in the Code of Ethics. The moment that we disclose [that lack of knowledge] you’ve lost that trust with the consumer for the rest of your relationship with them.”
Read that again. The National Association of REALTORS® believes that if its members are honest with consumers, consumers will stop trusting them. They said the quiet part out loud, in the official minutes. And remember the debate on disclosure of referral fees? Oy vey.
For as long as I’ve been in this business, people have talked about “raising the bar.” Make it harder to become a REALTOR®. Raise the standards, raise the professionalism, and the public’s trust follows. Great speech. It gets a standing ovation at every conference and dies in every committee, and the knowledge-gaps vote is just the latest body. Here’s why it always dies: NAR is paid by the head. At $156 a year times 1.44 million members, every agent who can’t clear a higher bar is revenue walking out the door. To NAR, a bad agent and a great agent are worth exactly the same $156. The organization that profits from more agents can never be the organization that demands better ones.
But you know who doesn’t get paid by the head? Most real estate brokerages. Compass makes money when transactions close, and in an AI world it makes more money when fewer, better agents close more of them. Reffkin is the one guy in the industry whose economics actually allow him to raise the bar. Thirty years of conference talk, and the manifestation of “raising the bar” turns out to be a brokerage, because it was never going to be the trade association selling memberships at the door.
Which brings me to the billboard I’d actually buy if I were Reffkin: “Compass agents are NOT REALTORS®.”
Think about what the REALTOR® brand carries right now. A $418 million Sitzer/Burnett settlement after a jury found the whole commission structure was rigged. A president who resigned days after a New York Times story detailing years of sexual harassment allegations. And now a trade association that formally voted against telling clients the truth about what its members don’t know. NAR’s own budget tells you where this is heading: membership sits at 1.44 million and they’re budgeting for 1.2 million, which means NAR is planning for a quarter of a million people to walk. Reffkin wouldn’t be starting an exodus. He’d be getting in front of one that NAR’s own finance committee already sees coming.
Yes, “Realtor” is synonymous with real estate agent. It’s Kleenex. That’s exactly why breaking from it is a story. Nobody writes about a brokerage quitting a trade association. Everybody writes about the largest brokerage in America announcing its agents are held to a higher standard than the one actual REALTORS® just voted to reject. And the exit ramp already exists. The ARA just landed RE/MAX the same week NAR subpoenaed them. An alternative association with franchise-scale membership and a chip on its shoulder is sitting right there.
(The honest hedge: yeah, I know the mechanics are messy. Anywhere’s brands are franchises, and Reffkin doesn’t own the franchisees or their NAR memberships. This starts as a Compass-brand move or it doesn’t start at all.)
There’s one more asset hiding in plain sight, and it’s the one I keep writing about. Everybody in this industry is fighting over supply. The next fight is demand. I wrote Monday about Gitcha publishing structured buyer demand into the MLS, and 48 hours later the M&A started. Who knows more buyers than the company with 330,000 agents? Compass is sitting on the largest book of buyer demand in America and treating it like a Rolodex.
Now, the riddle. Reffkin just spent $1.6 billion to own the most agents. Raising the bar implies standards, accountability, culling. You don’t get to be the biggest and the best at the same time, and in an AI world where consumers will only pay for agents worth paying for, best beats biggest. That’s an uncomfortable math problem for a guy who just bought 330,000 of them.
Step back and every Compass strategy has been the same strategy: an attempt to be something other than a real estate brokerage. Tech company. Inventory gatekeeper. Industry landlord. Wall Street told him what Compass was back in 2021.
